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ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS IN THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS*
Towards the Lex Fori for Admonitory Torts
Albert A. Ehrenzweigt
"If a cause of action in tort is created at the place of wrong, a cause of
action will be recognized in other states. If no cause of action is created
at the place of wrong, no recovery in tort can be had in any other state."'
This is the "rule" of the Restatement which, for the sake of "certainty,"
courts throughout the country during the last few decades have invoked
in nearly every torts conflicts case-only to reach widely differing
results by the haphazard and therefore unpredictable use of various
other devices.2 Arbitrary localization of the "place of wrong," arbitrary
"characterizations" (e.g., procedure, contract), arbitrary resort to public
policy, and even occasional arbitrary flight into renvoi, that "puerile"
concept "of violently prejudiced literature,"3 are some of the devices
which have been employed.
In a series of articles, I have tried to trace the origin of this con-
ceptualistic deviation of the last few decades, and to reexamine conflicts
cases involving contracts and torts with a view towards ascertaining the
law actually applied by the courts.4 In a separate study I hope to show
that, in the absence of established common-sense exceptions, such as the
lex validitatis for non-adhesion contracts, the lex fori has always been
the starting point for all judicial reasoning,5 and that this reasoning has
been only temporarily disturbed by pseudo-internationalist illusions,
* This article is the first in a series of two studies prepared by Professor Ehrenzweig for
the Cornell Law Quarterly. The second, "Miscegenation in the Conflict of Laws," will
appear in the Summer issue of this volume.
t See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 558, for biographical data.
I Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 384 (1934).
2 See, e.g., Currie, "Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation in the Conflict
of Laws," 10 Stan. L. Rev. 205 (1958). And see the author's papers on "The Place of
Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts: Law and Reason versus the Restatement," 36
Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1951); "Parental Immunity in the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason
versus the Restatement," 23 U. Chi. L. Rev. 474 (1956); "Guest Statutes in the Conflict
of Laws," 69 Yale L.J. 595 (1960); "Products Liability in the Conflict of Laws," 69 Yale
LJ. 794 (1960); "Vicarious Liability in the Conflict of Laws," 69 Yale L.J. - (1960).
3 Nussbaum, Principles of Private International Law 92 (1943). See also 1 Rabel, Con-
flict of Laws 75 (2d ed. 1958).
4 See the author's studies on "Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws," 53 Colum.
L. Rev. 1072 (1953); "The Real Estate Broker and the Conflict of Laws," 59 Colum. L. Rev.
303 (1959); "The Statute of Frauds in the Conflict of Laws: The Basic Rule of Valida-
tion," 59 Colum. L. Rev. 874 (1959); "Contracts in the Conflict of Laws," 60 Colum. L.
Rev. - (1960); "Contractual Capacity of Married Women and Infants in the Conflict of
Laws," 43 Minn. L. Rev. 899 (1959); and articles cited supra note 2.
5 See Ehrenzweig, "Lex Fori, in the Conflicts of Law-Exception or Rule," 32 Rocky
Mt. L. Rev. 13 (1959); Ehrenzweig, "The Lex Fori-The Basic Rule in the Conflict of
Laws," 58 Mich. L. Rev. - (1960).
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aided in this country by a largely obsolete law of jurisdiction which has
forced courts to look for a way to avoid application of their own law
when their jurisdiction is invoked though lacking contact with the case.'
The present study will offer an analysis of an area of torts law which,
owing to a relatively unambiguous policy basis and a limited number of
decided cases, is well qualified to serve as a touchstone for developing a
rational conflicts rule. "To be sure, tort law also has a compensatory
element. But that is of secondary consequence where, as in the tort of
alienation of affections, the principal reason why the state stamps con-
duct as wrongful is that so many people regard it as sinful, so many
regard it as offensive to public morals . . . 2" This view, set forth by
Judge Wyzanski in what is probably the leading case in the field, may be
considered the prevailing one, although isolated courts may occasionally
stress the compensatory element even as to this tort.8 Alienation of
affections and related torts are, therefore, used in this article to develop
the conflicts rules governing admonitory torts in contrast to those govern-
ing enterprise liabilities.9
A Texas citizen is sued in a Louisiana court for having alienated a
New York wife's affections in Texas. The plaintiff relies on the law of
Texas as the "place of wrong." But the court denies the claim as violating
the public policy of the forum.10
I See Ehrenzweig, "Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws," 69 Yale L.J. 595 (1960) ; and
in general Smith, "Torts and the Conflict of Laws," 20 Modern L. Rev. 447 (1957).
7 Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40, 42 (D. Mass.), aff'd sub nom. Parker v. Gordon,
178 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1949).
8 See note 17, infra.
9 See the author's studies, supra note 2. "Alienation of affections," for the purpose of
this article, includes several related bases of tort actions, such as criminal conversation and
enticement. See Prosser, Torts 686 (2d ed. 1955).
For analyses of the rules governing enterprise liability, see the author's studies, supra
note 2.
10 Gaines v. Poindexter, 155 F. Supp. 638 (W.D. La. 1957). To the same effect with
regard to forum statutes, see Thome v. Macken, 58 Cal. App. 2d 76, 136 P.2d 116 (1943);
Jacobsen v. Saner, 247 Ia. 191, 72 N.W.2d 900 (1955). For similar cases involving the
breach of a promise to marry, see Calcin v. Milburn, 176 F. Supp. 946 (D. N.J. 1959);
O'Connor v. Johnson, 74 F. Supp. 370 (W.D. N.Y. 1947); Fahy v. Lloyd, 57 F. Supp.
156 (D. Mass. 1944) ; A.B. v. C.D., 36 F. Supp. 85, 87 (E.D. Pa. 1940) (dictum). Concerning
international problems in this field, see Weidenbaum, "Breach of Promise in Private
International Law," 14 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 451 (1937). Had plaintiff, in the Gaines case,
supra, obtained jurisdiction in Texas, the favorable judgment of the Texas court would
probably have been entitled to full faith and credit in Louisiana. Parker v. Hoefer, 2
N.Y.2d 612, 142 N.E.2d 194, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 833 (1957). This inconsistency
between the fates of suits on judgments and those on the underlying facts could be
removed only by a reform of our jurisdictional system which should enable the plaintiff to
bring suit in the states of the matrimonial domicile and wrongful conduct. See note
16 infra. If the defendant were subjected to Texas jurisdiction in the absence of such
contacts, merely by virtue of his having been "caught" in Texas, the Texas court
would have to deny jurisdiction as an inconvenient forum. If it did assert jurisdiction,
its judgment should not be entitled to recognition in other states. See Ehrenzweig,
Conflict of Laws 200 n. 20 (1959). For an international case, see Neporany v. Kir, 5
App. Div. 2d 438, 173 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1958), appeal dismissed, 7 App. Div. 2d 836, 184
N.Y.S.2d 559 (lst Dep't 1959).
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A Massachusetts citizen is sued in a Massachusetts court for having
disturbed a Pennsylvania marriage in Massachusetts. The defendant
invokes Pennsylvania law which has abolished such actions. But he is
held liable under the law of the forum which is said to have a prevailing
interest in the conduct of its citizens."
A Georgia citizen is sued in a Georgia court for having alienated the
affections of an Illinois wife in Illinois. He invokes an Illinois statute
under which plaintiff's damages would be limited to those actually suf-
fered. But the court permits the jury to assess punitive damages under
the law of the forum.' 2
Notwithstanding purported reliance on the Restatement shiboleth,
these cases can be harmonized only by recognizing that a court will first
assume its own law to be properly applicable, and will deviate from this
assumption only if compelled to do so by obvious reasons of justice and
policy. No such reason existed for the Louisiana court to refuse applying
its own rejection of heart balm suits, albeit the offense was committed
elsewhere. No such reason existed for the Massachusetts court to neglect
its own interest in preventing adulterous conduct, and to accommodate
a defendant who had chosen a Pennsylvania woman for his exploits. And
no such reason existed for the Georgia court to refrain from applying its
own standard of damages, even though the alleged conduct had occurred
in another state. A court will not easily be persuaded by either a defend-
ant who pleads that he had arranged the adultery in reliance on a more
lenient law, or by a plaintiff who asserts that he had chosen the place of
his marital domicile with a view towards the greater legal protection
afforded this marriage under the law of that place.
Only one situation might, at least for the time being, require the recog-
nition of an exception to the Basic Rule of the Lex Fori. The catch-as-
catch-can rule of personal jurisdiction permits the plaintiff to catch the
defendant wherever service of process can be effected, without regard to
any contacts of the state with the case. Under this rule a defendant
might accidentally be forced into a forum which adheres to the common
law rule, although the laws of the other interested jurisdictions, including
those of the parties' domicile and the defendant's conduct, have abol-
ished actions for the alienation of affections. To be sure, the doctrine of
forum non conveniens will enable, and should compel, the court in such a
11 Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40, 42 (D. Mass.), per Wyzanski, J., aff'd sub
noma., Parker v. Gordon, 178 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1949). See Comment, 1 Stan. L. Rev.
759 (1949). But cf. Albert v. McGrath, 165 F. Supp. 461 (D.D.C. 1958), which reaches
the opposite result by a different "weighing of interests."
12 Orr v. Sasseman, 239 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1956). See also Luick v. Arends, 21 N.D.
614, 132 N.W. 353 (1911), and in general Annots., 31 A.L.R.2d 713, 36 A.L.R.2d 548.
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case to dismiss the suit.18 But the courts of states in which this doctrine
has not yet been recognized or employed for this purpose may have to re-
sort to a choice of law in order to do justice. They can do so by admit-
ting a defense allowed under the law of the place of conduct, thus adher-
ing to earlier American law and the rule continuing to be recognized in
all countries of the Commonwealth. 4 Under current American terminol-
ogy, the interpretation, in cases involving admonitory torts, of the "place
of wrong" formula as referring to the place of conduct rather than harm
would support this solution. 5
On the other hand, a defendant should hardly be heard with a defense
based upon law other than that of the lex Jori if the forum coincides with
the place of his conduct. To be sure, in one case the District Court for
the District of Columbia refused, under Maryland law, to entertain an
action for the alienation of affections by a Maryland husband although
the acts were alleged to have occurred in the District, a jurisdiction which
continues to adhere to the common law rule. 6 But this decision probably
results from a rather isolated, though entirely proper, compensatory
characterization of this type of action.' It may, perhaps, also be ex-
plained by the court's distaste for this type of action which is often,
though by no means always, used for extortion and vengeance, rather
than for morally desirable ends.' In any event, the peculiar relation
between the residual jurisdiction of the District and its surrounding states
would seem to deprive this decision in other jurisdictions of any value as
a precedent for the establishment of another exception to the Basic Rule.
Nor does such an exception seem warranted where the plaintiff, rather
than the defendant, claims to have been forced into an unfavorable forum
by that concomitant of the catch-as-catch-can rule which, despite a sub-
stantial contact, negates jurisdiction in the absence of intrastate service
13 See, in general, Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 122 ff. (1959).
14 Phillips v. Eyre, [1870] L.R. 6 Q.B. 1, 29. See, e.g., Falconbridge, Conflict of Laws
809 ff. (2d ed. 1954); Yntema, Book Review, 27 Can. B. Rev. 116 (1949).
15 For a detailed analysis, see Ehrenzweig, "The Place of Acting in Multistate Inten-
tional Torts," 36 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1951). See also Burke v. New York, New Haven and
Hartford R.R., 267 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1959) (malicious prosecution).
16 Albert v. McGrath, 165 F. Supp. 461 (D.D.C. 1958). Since the forum law was
not stated, the abduction case of Aberlin v. Zisman, 244 F.2d 620 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 857 (1957), in which a damage claim under New York law was denied
solely on the facts, is inconclusive. See also International Film Distribution Establishment
v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 14 Misc. 2d 203, 155 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County,
1956), leaving open, but not conceding, a suit for malicious prosecution under Italian
law. Cf. Pelella v. Pelella, 13 Misc. 2d 260, 176 N.Y.S.2d 862 (Sup. Ct. Kings County, 1958),
denying a claim for malicious prosecution under the law of a sister state.
17 Under this interpretation, rejected by most other courts and writers (supra note 7,
note 18 infra), the plaintiff "evidently feels that, in some manner or measure, money will
make him and his family whole again." Gaines v. Poindexter, supra note 10, at 639.
18 See, in general, Prosser, Torts 685 ff. (2d ed. 1955). For a defense of the action,
see Brown, "The Action for Alienation of Affections," 82 U. Pa. L. Rev. 472 (1934).
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of process.19 It might be argued that, in such a case, the plaintiff should
be free to invoke a law more favorable to him than that of a purely acci-
dental forum. But in only one case has a court, in this situation, applied
the common law of alienation of affections, which was operative in the
state of the plaintiff's domicile, instead of the forum's own statute.0
Even this case must now be considered overruled2' and discredited. 2
Moreover, it may be concluded that, because of current changes in the
law of jurisdiction, this situation does not justify a second exception to
the Rule. In view of the recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court,23
a statute of the state of the "place of wrong" permitting suit for
the alienation of affections upon constructive service would probably be
upheld as constitutional whether that place be identified as the state of
the matrimonial domicile or that of the conduct. If the state has not
made use of this constitutional power, it may be assumed to lack interest
in the extraterritorial common law protection of its citizens.
CONCLUSION
This brief analysis of a conspicuous example of a prevailing admon-
itory tort supports the conclusion that as to such torts, courts, far from
being prepared to accept the mechanical "place of wrong" formula of
the Restatement, have in fact adhered to the historical basic rule of the
lex fori. This will be less surprising if we remember the historical affinity
of all tort law with criminal law, and that courts in criminal cases have
always and everywhere applied their own law even to acts committed
abroad.24
19 Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 1 ff., 88 ff., 102 ff. (1959).
20 Wawrzin v. Rosenberg, 12 F. Supp. 548 (E.D.N.Y. 1935). The court permitted suit
under New Jersey law even though New Jersey had, in the meantime, abolished such
actions-a more than doubtful decision which a state court would hardly have supported.
21 The case was decided prior to Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487
(1941), which compels federal district courts to follow the conflict rules of the state in
which they sit.
22 Fahy v. Lloyd, 57 F. Supp. 156 (D. Mass. 1944) (suit for breach of a Bahama Island
contract to marry, allegedly committed in Connecticut, dismissed under Massachusetts
law and public policy). On the related problem of intertemporal conflicts law concerning
facts which occurred prior to the enactment of heart balm statutes, see Magierowski v.
Buckley, 39 N.J. Super. 534, 121 A.2d 749 (1956).
23 See, in general, Ehrenzweig, "Pennoyer is Dead-Long Live Pennoyer," 30 Rocky
Mt. L. Rev. 285 (1958); Ehrenzweig, op. cit. supra note 19, at 96 ff.
24 Jurisdiction may be taken by a state over "a result happening within the state of
an act done outside the state." Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 428, Comment b (1934).
Whether this event is a crime is determined by the law of the forum. Restatement, Con-
flict of Laws § 428(1) (1934).
